In their words:
The wrongful death and pain and suffering causes of action, premised upon
the alleged negligent issuance of life insurance policies, fail to state a
cause of action. New York does not presently recognize such a theory of
recovery based on the negligent issuance of an insurance policy (see Katchalova v Borger, 7 Misc 3d 966). Indeed, the circumstances of this case [Perchikov allegedly murdered the plaintiff's decedent in order to obtain the proceeds of the life insurance policies that she took out naming him as the beneficiary -ed.] do not even fall under any of the scenarios pursuant to which other jurisdictions have recognized such a theory of recovery (see Katchalova v Borger, supra; Bajwa v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 208 Ill 2d 414; Bacon v Federal Kemper Life Assur. Co., 400 Mass 850; Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v Lopez, 443 So 2d 947, 948 [Fla. 1983]; Burton v John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 164 Ga App 592 ; Ramey v Carolina Life Ins. Co., 135
SE 2d 362 [S.C. 1964]; Liberty Natl Life Ins. Co. v Weldon, 100 So 2d 696 [Ala.
1957]). Thus, the plaintiff seeks to recover pursuant to a theory of negligent issuance of an insurance policy under circumstances in which no other court has recognized such a claim. We decline to recognize such a claim in this case.